Server Surface
The complete inventory of Lolly's server-side components. This page exists so that one statement can be made precisely: the core product — rendering, exporting, and verifying — runs entirely on your device, and everything that does not run on your device is listed below, with what it does, what it holds, and what happens if you turn it off.
If a Lolly deployment exposes a network endpoint that is not on this page, it is not part of Lolly.
The shape of a deployment
A Lolly deployment is a static web application (the PWA the browser loads and then runs locally, offline-capable) plus two optional server components. Neither is in the path of normal use: opening a tool, editing, previewing, exporting, and verifying a file all complete with no request to either. A deployment that omits both is a fully working Lolly.
| Component | Route | Purpose | Optional? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Web shell | / (static files) | The app itself, served once, runs on-device | The app is this |
| MCP endpoint | /api/mcp (and the hosted mcp.lolly.tools) | Lets AI agents discover and render tools over MCP | Yes — remove it and the app is unaffected |
| Hot-link render | GET /tool/<id>.<ext> (part of the MCP function) | Renders a public catalogue tool from a plain URL — public, unauthenticated by design (public tool + catalogue data only, no Content Credentials) | Yes — currently disabled on lolly.tools (LOLLY_DISABLE_RENDER_GET=1, returns 404). Live on the lolly.art demo instance |
| MCP OAuth discovery | /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource (part of the MCP function) | Standard OAuth 2.1 metadata for MCP connector registration | Removed with the MCP endpoint |
| CA service | /api/ca | Issues short-lived signing certificates so exports can carry a verified identity in their Content Credentials | Yes — without it, exports still sign, anonymously |
MCP endpoint (services/mcp, api/mcp)
What it does. Exposes the catalogue and render path as MCP tools (lolly_list_tools, lolly_describe_tool, lolly_build_url, lolly_render, lolly_transform, lolly_verify) so an AI agent can produce finished, rule-bound assets. The serverless tier renders browser-free formats. The full endpoint at mcp.lolly.tools drives a headless browser for raster/PDF/animation/video.
Authentication. MCP tool calls require OAuth 2.1 (as an MCP connector) or a bearer access token held by the operator. Two deliberate exceptions: the hot-link render route GET /tool/<id>.<ext> is public and unauthenticated (it serves only public tool + catalogue data, never signs output, and can be disabled with LOLLY_DISABLE_RENDER_GET=1), and an operator can opt the whole endpoint into anonymous mode with LOLLY_MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS=1 (off by default).
What it stores. Nothing persistent. The endpoint processes each request and returns the rendered bytes. There is no user database and no stored render history. Operational logging is the platform's function logging, covered by the Privacy Policy.
lolly_transform operates on a file supplied in the call, in memory, for that call only. Nothing is written server-side.
Full reference: MCP Server.
CA service (services/ca, api/ca)
What it does. Content Credentials identity enrolment. You verify an identity: OpenID Connect (Google, SUSE IdP), GitHub OAuth with a verified address, or an emailed magic link (inbox control). Your browser then generates a non-extractable keypair on-device. The service issues a time-limited X.509 certificate that binds that public key to your verified identity. Your private key never leaves your device and never transits the service.
What it stores. No account database, and deliberately no issuance log (a privacy decision, documented in the Privacy Policy). Certificate lifetime is user-selectable: 7, 30, 90 or 365 days. The default is 30, and the deployment caps it (CA_CERT_MAX_DAYS). Expiry is the recall mechanism: there is no revocation infrastructure, so the lifetime you pick bounds misuse of a lost device. The service holds its own signing material and OIDC client secrets as deployment secrets.
If it is off, exports still carry a full, verifiable Content Credential, signed anonymously. That is the default anyway.
Full reference: Content Credentials Identity and the engineering deep-dive.
What is deliberately not here
- No render server for the app. The app never uploads your inputs or assets to produce an export.
- No verification server. Dropping a file on Verify parses and checks it locally. The file is never uploaded.
- No telemetry or analytics backend. No endpoint receives usage data. An automated test (
tests/no-trackers.test.ts) enforces that no analytics or tracking SDK appears anywhere in the shipped source. - No user accounts in the app. Identity enrolment (above) is the only sign-in anywhere, it is opt-in, and it produces a certificate on your device, not an account on a server.
The complete list of every network request the app itself can make (fonts, catalog sync, the optional endpoints above) is maintained in the Privacy Policy.
For self-hosters
Both components are ordinary processes you can run, omit, or replace. See Deployment. If you operate them, you are the operator of record for their logging and data handling. The Privacy Policy explains the split between what the software does (true everywhere) and what an operator chooses.
Security reports for any of the above: see SECURITY.md / /.well-known/security.txt.